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IMPLEMENTING THE POR'IFOLIO (SBU) CONCEPT 
During the past decade the concept of corporate strategy has enjoyed 
widespread and increasing popularity. One result of this popularity has been 
the development of sophisticated strategic plannillg systems within large, di-
versified firms. The portfolio or SBU concept has been unmatched in populari-
ty as a basis for these planning systems. A recent article in Fortune maga-
zine about corporate strategy even refers to the portfolio concept as having 
"magical appeal" for corporate managers.! Independent of the specific rea-
sons, the portfolio concept is strongly established as the primary basis for 
strategic planning systems in many large, diversified firms. Yet, despite 
this popularity, there has been suprisingly little research on the implementa-
tion process and its implications for effective strategic management. Fur-
thermore, in numerous conversations with executives the authors have found the 
implementation problems of "making it work" are, in fact, a pressing concern. 
This article summarizes the authors' research in this area and provides some 
guidelines based on that research that run counter to the conventional wisdo~ 
about implementation. 
The Portfolio Concept 
Although there are numerous slight variations of the portfolio concept, 
they all rely on a matrix or grid similar to the one shown in Exhibit 1. The 
matrix classifies businesses by product/market attractiveness along one axis 
and competitive position along the other axis. There are two basic approaches 
to measurement along these scales. One approach relies on a single measure-
able criterion along each axis while the other approach uses multiple measures 
(including subjective ones) along each axis (see Exhibit 2). Typically the 
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matrices or grids are divided into either four or nine "boxes" although the 
authors have observed some with significantly more. Exhibit 2 illustrates two 
of the most commonly encountered matrices. 
Regardless of the particular layout chosen for the matrix, the basic idea 
behind the portfolio concept remains the same: the position (or box) that a 
business occupies on the matrix should determine the "grand thrust" or "mis-
sion" around which the strategy for the business is developed. Although these 
missions vary somewhat depending on the particular matrix, the top half of Ex-
hibit 2 provides a typical illustration. (The discussion of implementation 
below is independent of the particular matrix used • ) Here the mission of the 
"cash cows" is to generate cash flow that can be re-deployed to proiUising 
"question marks." The mission of the "question marks" is to aggressively gain 
competitive position with the needed investment funds coming from the cash 
cows. (Obviously the number of question marks in the corporate portfolio must 
be balanced with the cash generation capabilities of the cash cows.) The mis-
sion of the stars is to ensure their own long-term competitive position. F i-
nally, the mission of the dogs is to generate positive cash flow until they 
can be opportunistically divested. Although this introduction to the portfo-
lio concept has been brief, it will be adequate for the authors' later devel-
opments. The key point is that different boxes on the matrix denoted differ-
ent grand thrusts or missions for the business. The reader who is unfamilar 
with the portfolio concept or who desires a deeper understanding can refer to 
several references.2 
What Conventional Wisdom Says About Implementation 
Around the portfolio concept there has developed an informal conventional 
wisdom for using it as a basis for a strategic planning system. The authors 
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have found it in popular articles, in the executive offices of companies 
thinking about adopting the portfolio concept., and in the classrooms of sever-
al business schools and management development programs. The logic of the 
conventional wisdom is at once simple and compelling. When analyzed and dis-
tilled the conventional wisdom holds that there are three major steps in im-
plementing the portfolio concept as the basis of a planning system: 
(1) The firm is divided into strategic business units or SBU's. 
This involves determining the different businesses the fin~ 
is in by specifying the economically distinct product/ 
market segments and the firm's resources that are dedicated 
to each segment. The objective is to divide the firm into 
the most relevant strategic entities. 
(2) Each of these SBU's is evaluated against the dimensions of 
the matrix. On the basis of this analysis the appropriate 
grand thrust or mission is assigned to each SBU. 
(3) A strategy is developed within each SBU and reviewed by 
corporate management to ensure congruence with the assigned 
mission. 
This view of implementation is a straight-forward extension of the basic 
logic of the portfolio concept. Unfortunately the authors have found that 
this approach does not work in most large, diversified firms. In a study of 
ten firms with varying levels of experience with the portfolio concept one of 
the aufhors found that none had been successful using the conventional wis-
dom.3 Instead a significantly different approach evolved within these firms. 
Further research by both authors confirmed this result. Several reasons 
underlie the failure of the conventional wisdom, and to them we now turn. 
Why the C.onventional Wisdom Is Often Inappropriate 
The conventional wisdom is inappropriate for most large, diversified 
firms because it implicitly assumes that a firm can be unambiguously divided 
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into a "reasonable number" of independent (in terms of markets and pro.duction 
processes) "single businesses." If a finn can be unambiguously divided into 
independent, single businesses, then these businesses can be defined as SBU's 
and each assigned amission independent of the others. Furthermore, the term 
"reasonable number" means that the number of businesses (constituted as SBU's) 
is small enough that corporate level management can develop the matrix posi-
tions, assign the missions, and review SBU strategies and performance to en-
sure congruence with the assigned missions. However, the authors' research 
has shown that for large, diversified firms: (1) SBU's cannot be unambiguous-
ly constituted as single businesses; (2) the extent of diversification pre-
cludes the "reasonable number" criterion discussed above, and (3) the related-
ness of diversification can preclude the independence of the SBU's. 
The Ambiguous ~otion o~_~ingle Business 
The concept of what constitutes a single business is difficult to opera-
tionalize. The nature of the problem stems from the fact that a product/ 
market segment can be defined in a variety of ways. In fact, there is gener-
ally a whole hierarchy of product/market segments. As a hypothetical example. 
consider a firm that among other things manufactures and markets appliances. 
A logical breakdown might be into specific products (e.g., washers, ranges, 
microwave ovens., etc.). Alternative breakdowns·(from among many possibili-
ties) could be into commercial and home appliances, into different price/ 
quality segments, or into different geographic segments. These breakdowns 
could be combined to yield increasingly finer segments (e.g., the commercial, 
microwave oven business, or the European, high quality home dishwasher busi-
ness). So, in sum, SBU's could be defined in a myriad of different ways rang-
ing from the entire appliance business to much smaller segments such 
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as the European, high quality, home dishwasher business. Regardless of which 
segments are eventually chosen to define these businesses, arguments could be 
·advanced for other segments. Since segments finer than those finally selected 
will generally exist, arguments could be advanced that the definition aggre-
gates several single businesses. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the po-
sition of the business on the matrix may depend on the definition chosen for 
the SBU. For example, if the entire appliance business is defined as an SBU, 
then a "cash cow" mission may be appropriate. However; in a finer breakdown 
by product the microwave oven business could quite conceivably be defined as 
an SBU with a "question mark" mission. The hierarchical nature of product/ 
market segments frustrates the unambiguous definition of single businesses as 
SBU' s. 
The Extent of Diversification 
Closely related to the problems caused by the ambiguous nature of a sin-
gle business are the problems inherent in the extent of diversification pre-
sent in large diversified firms. The basic nature of the problem is that the 
number of product/market segments in which these firms participate is so large 
that it completely swamps the "reasonable number" criterion described above. 
As an example consider the Eaton Corporation, a firm which had sales of 
$2.11 billion in 1977 and is certainly~ considered to be a conglomerate. In 
the Eaton 1977 Annual Report reference is made to over 400 product/market seg-
ments that are said to consist of "a single product or family of rel.ated pro-
ducts which go into a well defined and unified market." Examples given in-
clude economy truck transmission, narrow aisle lift trucks, agricultural 
scales, and gas control values. Is it reasonable to expect that for each of 
these over 400 product/market segments meaningful strategy and performance re-
views can be conducted by corporate management? Furthermore, what size staff 
would be needed merely to develop the information necessary for positioning 
these segments on the matrix. The scope of such efforts at the corporate 
level would certainly need to be heroic if not foolish. The application of 
these results to most large, diversified corporations will obviously yield 
similar results.-
The Relatedness of Diversification 
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Intimately interwoven with the ambiguous nature of a single business is 
the related manner in which most large firms are diversified. It is a known 
fact that most firms tend to diversify into areas related to their "core" bus-
iness.4 The notable exceptions are, of course, the conglomerates. This re-
latedness of diversification exacerbates the already ambiguous nature of a 
single business and simultaneously prevents the achievement of independent 
SBU's. The residual dependency among SBU's frustrates the assignment of mis-
sions independently to each SBU because the SBU's themselves are no longer 
strategically independent entities. 
As an example of these ideas consider the previous example of appliances, 
only this time assume a firm initially only manufactures and markets home 
washers and dryers. Diversification could logically take this firm into the 
manufacture and sale of home microwave ovens and trash compactors. This move 
itself will exacerbate the problems associated with business definition as 
previously discussed. Furthermore, assume that the washers and dryers are de-
fined as a "home laundry" SBU and that the microwave ovens and trash_ compact-
ors defined as a "home kitchen" SBU. These two SBU's are obviously not stra-
tegically independent since, among other things they may share distribution 
channels, be often bought in combination (i.e. by housing contractors), share 
a common assembly facility, and mutually benefit from brand name advertising 
efforts. Inevitably there must be some coordination of strategy among the two 
7 
and this will be extremely difficult if different strategic missions are as-
signed (e.g. cash cow for the laundry SllU and question mark for the kitchen 
SBU). Grouping them all together into an appliance SBU will probably result 
in the assignment of an inappropriate mission to some parts (i.e. overall cash 
cow mission would probably be inappropriate for the trash compactors). The 
alternative of breaking them down farther (e.g. washers, dryers, microwave 
ovens, and trash compactors) will only increase the interdependency between 
them. As this example illustrates the related nature of much diversification 
prevents the achievement of independent SBU's and hence reduces the usefulness 
of the conventional wisdom for implementing the portfolio concept. In view of 
this and the arguments of the previous two sections the conventional wisdom 
would seem to be of limited usefulness. We now turn to a more useful approach 
which the authors have found helps overcome these objections. 
The alternative approach is much less dogmatic than the conventional wis-
dom. It relies more on a flexible, situational matching of implementation to 
the circumstances of the particular firm. Specifically, the alternative ap-
proach ~nvolves the hierarchical application of the portfolio concept at mul-
tiple organizational levels, the coordination of inputs among these levels, 
and the purposeful but limited variation of managerial systems and processes 
across different strategic missions. 
Hierarchi~~l Ap_E_~ication 
Under the conventional wisdom, the management of a firm confronts a di-
lemma in the definition of SBU's. If each distinct product/market segment is 
used as the basis of an SBU, then the number of SBU's is likely to be unman-
ageably large from the corporate level. On the other hand, if only a 
----------------------------------
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manageable number of SBU's are defined, then the mission assigned to any par-
ticular SBU is likely to be inappropriate for substantial segments of the SBU 
(since the SBU is actually an aggregation of businesses). Furthern1ore, a 
strategic plan based on a single mission for such an aggregated SBU will like-
ly ignore substantial differences among the component businesses. 
To overcome this dilemma it is necessary to recognize that the applica-
tion of the portfolio concept must be hierarchical in order to mirror the hi-
erarchical nature of product/market segments. In this manner descending lev-
els of the hierarchy can be used to refine the analysis and to achieve a bet-
ter matching of strategic entity to product/market segment. 
Although the authors believe that several levels of anlysis may be ulti-
mately necessary in some firms; they have observed that two overcome most of 
the problems associated with the conventional wisdom• Hence the subsequent 
discussion will concentrate on a two level hierarchy. The extension of these 
ideas to hierarchies with more levels should be obvious. 
To illustrate the nature of these ideas again consider the appliance ex-
ample. Among other things, a firm produces and markets home appliances. From 
the corporate level an SBU called "home appliances" is created and assigned a 
cash cow strategic mission. At the same time, although a home appliance SBU 
is created, both corporate management and SBU management recognized that this 
represents a coarse or "aggregated" level of analysis that must be subsequent-
ly refined. In turn, the management of the SBU refines the analysis by "dis-
aggregating" it into segments such as home laundry (washers and dryers), 
microwave ovens, diswashers, and trash compactors. Exhibit 3 details the na-
ture of the differences between the two levels of analysis. While the corpo-
rate level depicts a monolithic cash cow mission, the SBU-level shows several 
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strategic entities with both cash cow and question mark missions. Examination 
of this example shows that there are three essential steps. 
(1) Group related businesses together to form aggregated SliU's. 
The essential logic of this step is that (as discussed earlier) each SBU 
must make sense as a single, though aggregated, product/market segment. How 
else can product/market attractiveness and competitive position be evaluated 
and how else can a meaningful (aggregated) strategic mission be assigned? The 
necessity of such a step arises because (as previously discussed) a division 
of a firm into all of its product/market segments results in a number that is 
unmanageable from the corporate level (i.e., the need to aggregate arises). 
The obvious question is how much to aggregate. No simple answer is possible, 
but there are some general guidelines. The number should be manageable from 
the corporate level. This will obviously depend on the management style of 
the CEO and on the amount and quality of staff support available. However, 
the authors have not observed any stable planning system with more than 45 
SBU's, and hence this number may be taken as an approximate, practical upper 
limit. (The authors have observed firms starting implementation with over 100 
SBU's, but this number rapidly decays as the management overload at the cor-
porate level is felt.) Second, the more related· the businesses of the firm 
the fewer SBU's that are required. In essence the more related a firm is, the 
fewer different businesses it is in. One of the authors studied the related-
ness of six large firms using the portfolio concept as a basis for strategic 
planning. The results are illustrated in Exhibit 4 and show that the nUiuber 
of SBU's ranged from 6 for the smallest and most related to 43 for the largest 
and least related.S So, in sum, the practical range would seem to be approxi-
mately from 2 to 50 (aggregated) SBU's. 
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One interesting implication of this aggregation process would seem to be 
that use of the portfolio concept as a basis for a corporate-wide planning 
system by large conglomerates is limited. By definition a conglomerate par-
ticipates in unrelated businesses. Therefore, they cannot meaningfully be ag-
gregated. (What is meant by product/market attractiveness and competitive 
position of an SBU composed of an insurance business and a rental car busi-
ness?) Hence, if the conglomerate participates in more than about 50 differ-
ent businesses, the portfolio concept is not a practical approach. (Interest-
ingly, the authors are not aware of any large conglomerate which has adopted 
the portfolio concept as the basis of a corporate-wide strategic planning sys-
tem.) Exhibit 5 illustrates the nature of the aggregation problem in terms of 
the extent and relatedness of diversification as it applies to conglomerates 
and other types of firms. 
Once the definition of aggregated SBU's is complete, they may be evalu-
ated against the dimensions of the matrix. 
(2) Develop the aggregated strategic mission. 
The second step is straight-forward and similar to the conventional wis-
dom except that the aggreated nature of the SBU is recognized. For the home 
appliance example a cash cow mission as shown in Exhibit 5 could conceivably 
be appropriate. The next step is to proceed down the hierarchy to the next 
level of analysis. 
(3) Define the component businesses of the SBU and develop appropriate 
strategic missions for them. 
This step represents the disaggregation of the previous corporate level 
analysis and takes place at the SBU level. The logic is that a refinement of 
the corporate level analysis is made to incorporate the finer product/market 
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structure of the firm at an organizational level where the appropriat~ exper-
tise is available. Exhibit 3 illustrates this for the home appliance exaiDple. 
Although at the disaggregated level a cash cow mission still predominates, 
other missions for other segments of the SBU are apparent. 
The experience of the authors has been that generally from 2 to lJ seg-
ments of each SBU are identified and evaluated in this step. Given the earli-
er discussion about the practical limits on the number of SBU's one can now 
envision a total of several hundred product/market segments being identified 
and evaluated. Even for extremely large firms such numbers can provide a rea-
sonably clear picture of the product/market structure. At this point the ar-
gument has been developed to where the necessity to coordinate the two anal-
yses. should be obvious. 
Coordinating the Inputs 
If there is no coordination between the two levels of analysis then inev-
itably substantial disagreements can develop among corporate and SBU IDan-
agers. Each will hold a single partially exclusive view of any particular 
SBU. For example, a particular SBU may be seen at the corporate level as pur-
suing a "pure" cash cow mission. If the plans and capital budget of this SBU 
are devised using a disaggregated analysis (as they should be) then the cor-
porate review will likely focus on the gap between the cash cow mission and 
the actual content of the plans. In our home appliance example (see Exhibit 
3) the corporate expectation may be for a $50 million annual cash throw-off 
from the SBU. However, the SBU plans may reflect only a $25 million throw-off 
with the remaining $25 million being invested in the microwave oven and trash 
compactor businesses. Naturally a process of negotiation always occurs around 
plans, but this negotiation cannot resolve a fundamentally different view of 
an SBU. 
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To overcome such difficulties the authors believe that it is necessary to 
consciously build in mechanisms for coordinating the two levels of analysis. 
Although no single definitive set of mechanisms is currently known to exist, 
some which are known to be useful can be discussed. 
Perhaps the most obvious and yet the most important mechanism is explicit 
recognition at both levels of analysis of the perspective of the other. In 
essence this facilitates the planning process by legitimizing the different 
perspectives of both participants as complementary instead of mutually exclu-
sive. This can be accomplished through planning conferences, management de-
velopment programs (which stress the hierarchical nature of the portfolio con-
cept), and the actual design of the planning systems. The planning manual, if 
one is used, should recognize both levels of analysis and their necessity. 
The strategic planning system should be designed around the two levels of 
analysis. The system should be structured so that the basic planning entities 
are the individual segments of each particular SBU. The SBU plans reviewed at 
corporate level should be aggregations of these plans stressing overall SBU 
strategy with short summaries of the individual segments and their missions 
included (perhaps in an appendix). Furthermore, th~ basic financial objec-
tives of an SBU can be stated within the plans in a summary form (perhaps in 
an appendix) which shows how they are arrived at·by aggregation. 
Each year the detailed plans of a limited number of segments of SHU's can 
be carefully scrutinized at the coporate level. These segments can be chosen 
randomly or for their strategic relevance to the firm as a whole. Such an 
audit in addition to its direct benefits communicates the importance of the 
individual SBU segments as planning entities and reinforces the basic hier-
archical nature of the planning system. 
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many of the firm's managers. The important point is that in selecting a man-
ager for a particular business, the fit between the style and personality of 
the manager, and the strategic mission of the business should be a major con-
sideration. 
Another component of management which should be varied across the strate-
gic missions is the reward system. The logic involved here is once again sim-
ple. A manager should be rewarded for performance against his assigned stra-
tegic mission as embodied in his strategic plan. Hence, for example, managers 
of cash cows should be rewarded for generating cash and managers of question 
marks should be rewarded for gaining competitive position even at the expense 
of current profits. One implication is that a manager of a question mark may 
receive a significant bonus for gaining competitive position even though prof-
its were minimal and substantial investment funds were used from other busi-
nesses. One the other hand, a cash cow manager may receive no bonus because, 
although his ROI was substantial it fell considerably below the agreed upon 
objective in his plans. The important point is that managerial motivations 
need to be aligned with differing strategic missions (aggregated or disaggre-
gated) instead of a uniform corporate directive to increase earnings/ROI each 
year. 
A final component of management that needs to be differentiated across 
strategic missions is capital budgeting. Resource allocation is one of the 
main (if not the main) levers available to corporate management to ensure that 
the missions are implemented. To do this requires that the essence "'of justi-
fying a capital project should revolve around the strategic mission. For ex-
ample, a capital project for a question mark could have a relatively long pay-
back and low return if the competitive position could be significantly im-
proved. By contrast a capital project for a dog should require an immediate 
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and high return to justify using funds there. As a further example, a govern-
ment mandated pollution control system should be almost automatically approved 
for a star, but with a dog abandonment would have to be considered. In gener-
al, specific criteria should be developed for approval of projects for each of 
the strategic missions and these criteria should be applied at the disaggre-
gated and aggregated levels of anlysis. In this manner resources can be dis-
tributed in congruence with the differing strategic missions. 
The Alternative Approach: A Review 
To summarize the alternative approach to implementing the portfolio con-
cept as -the basis for a planning system, a short review should be useful. 
The alternative approach starts with the assumption that in order to ob-
tain a manageable number of SBU's at the corporate level and yet to reflect 
the full diversity and complexity of the firm's product/market structure, a 
hierarchical application of the analysis is necessary. At the corporate level 
of the hierarchy the authors' research shows that the practical upper limit is 
about 50 SBU's. The actual number will depend on the diversity of the firm,. 
the management style of the CEO, and the amount and quality of staff support_ 
available. At the SBU level a disaggregated analysis of from 2 to 15 segments 
composes the second level of the hierarchy. (A further breakdown at the seg-
ment level may also be useful in some firms.) Hence, with two levels of hier-
archy in the planning system, a product/market diversity of up to several hun-
dred segments can be reflected. 
To help coordinate the inputs between the two levels specific mechanisms 
such as those suggested earlier need to be designed into the system. Further-
more, each level needs to recognize the legitimacy and necessity of the other 
level of analysis. One further comment deserves to be made here. The SBU 
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substantial appeal of this approach is that it promises to recentralize a sig-
nificant portion of the business strategies. What CEO has not wished for 
additional control over the direction of individual businesses. Such control 
is illusory however. 
Instead of centralized control of business strategies, the authors be~ 
lieve the portfolio concept offers a general approach to strategy development 
throughout the firm that can be matched to the specific circumstances of a 
business or managerial level, but still retain a uniformity of approach. 
Specifically the portfolio concept is a common set of strategic assumptions 
and a common language for dealing with strategy in a diversified firm. Fur-
thermore, both the language and the assumptions are independent of the indi-
vidual characteristics of any particular business. 
Inherent within the portfolio concept is a common set of assumptions 
about strategy. This includes how the strategic mission of the business is 
established (by evaluation against the dimensions of the matrix). Further-
more, the strategic mission contains certain assumptions about the broad stra-
tegic role of a business. These assumptions are, in fact, the strategic mis-
sion. For example, a cash cow should generate substantial cash for deployment 
elsewhere. Similar assumptions are contained in any other strategic mission 
regardless of the particular matrix used. Notice that these assumptions are 
independent of the detailed characteristics of any particular business. A 
cosmetics business and a home appliance business may have the same generic 
strategy even though the detailed nature of these two businesses is substan-
tially different. Furthermore, the method of establishing or questioning this 
common strategic mission is the same (i.e., by evaluation against the dimen-
sions of the matrix) and does not depend on the individual characteristics of 
the different businesses. 
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The portfolio concept also provides a common language-independent of the 
idiosyncrasies of any particular business for talking about strategy. The 
cosmetics business and the home appliance business can be discussed in terms 
that are independent of each business. There are, of course, many features of 
the total strategy, as opposed to the strategic mission, that can only be dis-
cussed in industry specific terminology. Still a significant, independent 
terminology is contained within the portfolio concept. 
The implications of this common set of assumptions about strategy and 
common language for communicating about strategy are straightforward and yet 
significant. This set of assumption and language permits the hierarchical de-
termination of strategy discussed earlier while still maintaining a consistent 
and interrelated approach. The de termination of a business' strategy can be 
logically split between the aggregated and disaggregated analyses, and yet 
consistency of approach and coordination among the two processes can be main-
tained. Furthermore strategic communication is facilitated both horizontally 
and vertically. 
Contrast this to the the situation without the portfolio concept. Here 
the strategies are seen as entirely dependent on detailed knowledge about the 
specific businesses. The standard view of strategy was set forth by Andrews 
(1971) in The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Consider the following from this 
book: 
Deciding what the strategy should be, is at least ideally, a ra-
tional undertaking. Its principal subactivities include identify-
ing opportunities and threats in the company's environment and ··at-
taching some estimate of risk to the discernible alternatives. 
Before a choice can be made, the company's strengths and weak-
nesses must be appraised. Its actual or potential capacity to 
take advantage of perceived market needs or to cope with attendent 
.risks must be estimated as objectively as possible. The strategic 
alternative which results from a matching of opportunity with 
corporate capability at an acceptable level of risk is what we may 
call an economic strategy.S 
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Notice how Andrew's concept of strategy is highly dependent on idiosyncratic 
knowledge of a particular business. Specifically, one must be knowledgeable 
of both the environment (threats and opportunities) and the internal strengths 
and weaknesses, and this requires in-depth knowledge of the business. Fur-
thermore, for each business in a diversified firm this knowledge will be 
substantially different. The only generally imposed strategic direction from 
the corporate level will be the imperative to "maximize or improve earnings/ 
ROI" in each business. There is no generally shared set of assumptions (i.e., 
question marks should rapidly gain competitive position) and no common lan-
guage for talking about strategy under this approach. The business strategies 
become highly decentralized at the divisional or product/market profit center 
level. It is difficult or impossible for managers not directly involved to 
understand and hence question the strategy of a particular business. Contrast 
this to the situation under the portfolio concept, where the same language and 
assumptions are used by managers throughout the firm. Although many compo-
nents of a business strategy must still be developed within the guidelines 
suggested by Andrews the language and assumptions of the portfolio concept 
still provide the core of the strategy. It would seem that the portfolio con-
cept can be used in large, diversified firms to facilitate and rationalize 
strategy throughout the firm. However, this can only be achieved by adopting 
a flexible, viewpoint instead of the dogmatic approach of an unambiguous cor-
porate level strategy framework. 
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note: diameter of circles proportional to sales. 
EXHIBIT 4 
AGGREGATION AND DIVERSIFICATION 
Diversification Rank of 
Category A Firm 1977 Sales No. of ~BU's 
Dominant Vertical JKL 4 6 
PQR 3 14 
Related Constrained ABC 5 24 
GHI 6 30 
Related Linked HNO 2 38 
DEF 1 43 
A. As fully described in Richard P. Rumelt, Strategy, Structure and 
Economic Performance, (Cambridge, }fussachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1974). The three categories used here may be summarized as follows: 
Dominant Vertical - a vertically integrated finn deriving 70-90% of 
annual revenues from "base" business. 
Related Constrained - a firm deriving less than 70% of annual reve-
nues from "base" business to each other. 
Related Linked - a firm deriving less than 70% of annual revenues 
from "base" business where the component businesses although related 
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